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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has established three methods of analysis (or
rules) for antitrust cases: the Per Se analysis,1 the Quick Look analysis,2
and the Rule of Reason analysis.3 Each analysis comes with different
inquiries. The Per Se analysis focuses on the actions of the defendant.
The quick look analysis focuses on the positive and the negative effects
of the defendant’s actions and then balances these effects. The Rule of
Reason analysis investigates an array of elements, which includes the
plaintiff’s economic injuries, the market power, and the actions of the
defendant, amongst others.
The Supreme Court made clear in Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society 4 that trial courts must select the appropriate mode of
analysis at the beginning of the trial. The Supreme Court also affirmed
the rule of reason as the default of the three modes of analysis.5 Beyond
offering these two clarifications, the Court provided little guidance on
how to choose the appropriate rule, yet this choice may make or break a
case.
Counter-intuitively, courts must choose the rule at the beginning of
a trial, rather than during the course of the trial or prior to presenting the

1
“Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect
of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.” United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
2
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)
[hereinafter BMI] and its progeny created the quick look analysis, affirmed in California
Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). See Section II infra.
3
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
4
457 U.S. 332, 337 n.3 (1982).
5
“The rule of reason “presumptively applies . . . under which antitrust plaintiffs
must demonstrate that a particular contract or combination is in fact unreasonable and
anticompetitive before it will be found unlawful.” Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5
(2006).
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case to the jury.6 This means that courts decide how to analyze antitrust
cases based only upon the facts of the case as pled in the complaint and
answer. Selecting the rule affects the presumptions; these presumptions
affect which party carries the burden of proof. The rule also affects
whether the case can be sent to a jury. While juries can decide per se
and rule of reason cases, they cannot determine quick look cases.7
The question of whether cases decided under quick look can go to
the jury came before the Third Circuit in Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP
Tour Inc.8 The Third Circuit wrote that quick look cannot not be sent to
the jury, basing its decision upon the American Bar Association model
jury instructions.9 The Third Circuit relied upon a misguided source and
failed to follow the subtle guidance the Supreme Court provided in
California Dental Ass’n v. FTC.10
This paper disagrees with the decision of the Third Circuit and
makes a two-part argument that trial courts can submit quick look cases
to a jury. First, I examine the quick look jurisprudence and how lower
courts have applied all three methods of analysis. Part I explains that
courts have been reluctant to let quick look go to the jury because juries
are not sophisticated enough to handle quick look and because they
reason that quick look analysis amounts to a summary judgment.11 This
section also argues that with the fading application of per se, quick look
will become more important in the future.
In Part II, I argue that quick look ought to go to the jury because,
according to California Dental Ass’n, the three methods of analysis are

6
“The selection of the proper mode of antitrust analysis is a question of law, which
[courts] review de novo.” Cal., ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th
Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
7
See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
701 (1962) (discussing the type of evidence a jury can balance in per se cases). In
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) and Continental TV, Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Supreme Court affirmed rule of reason
cases sent to the jury. See Section III. A & B infra.
8
610 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2010).
9
Id. at 833.
10
526 U.S. 756 (1999).
11
I would argue that quick look is not limited to summary judgment because it would
seem redundant to have both summary judgment and quick look in Antitrust law. They
serve different functions and as such abide by different standards and rules. See
generally Edward Brunet, Antitrust Summary Judgment and the Quick Look Approach,
62 SMU L. REV. 493 (2009) (detailing the relationship between quick look and summary
judgment).
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part of the same inquiry.12 Since the three methods of analysis live along
a spectrum of analyses and since per se and rule of reason already go to
the jury, quick look should also go to the jury.
In Part III, I argue that quick look ought to go to the jury because
the Supreme Court decision creates an observer standard.13 The observer
standard sparks confusion about whether quick look involves questions
of fact, which the jury can weigh, or questions of law reserved for the
court. To understand this observer standard, this section looks at other,
better-defined observer standards.
The Court employs observer
standards in two other contexts, the Establishment Clause and Patent
contexts. In both of these contexts, the Supreme Court defines observer
in a way that implicates questions of fact (and juries) to different
degrees. Since other comparable observer standards go to the jury, I
argue that the California Dental Ass’n quick look observer standard must
involve juries as well.
A trial court’s rule selection has resounding impact upon antitrust
cases whether the parties litigate or settle their case. Whether the case
can be sent to the jury, however, should not be impacted by the rule
selection. This paper questions why the Supreme Court would create an
antitrust specific summary judgment, discusses how inconsistent it would
be for quick look not to go to the jury, and objects to the notion that
defendants could avoid jury trials simply by requesting quick look.
II. QUICK LOOK: A BRIEF HISTORY
The Supreme Court created rule of reason, then per se, and finally
quick look, almost as gap filler. 14 This chronology supports that the
Court created quick look to address a need: the Court wanted the
12

This paper argues that since per se and rule of reason are submitted to the jury,
quick look should be as well, without weighing in on the debate of whether courts should
submit to a jury per se and rule of reason questions.
13
“In California Dental, [the Supreme Court] held (unanimously) that abandonment
of the ‘rule of reason’ in favor of presumptive rules (or a ‘quick-look’ approach) is
appropriate only where ‘an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.” FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223,
2237 (2013) (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 770).
14
C. Paul Rogers III, The Incredible Shrinking Antitrust Law and the Antitrust Gap,
52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 67 n.255 (2013) (arguing that the expending rule of reason has
created more gap uncertainty, which quick look has failed to reduce). For a better
understanding of the quick look, see Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and
Characterization: the Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (2012)
(discussing the evolution of the application of the rule of reason and the rise of quick
look).
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flexibility of rule of reason without losing the efficiencies of per se and
hence created quick look. Antitrust literature, however, does not dwell
much on quick look because it is the victim of a vicious circle: courts do
not apply quick look as often as per se or rule of reason because
plaintiffs do not request quick look as often as per se and rule of reason;
plaintiffs do not request the application of quick look because plaintiffs
cannot well predict the outcome of its applications; plaintiffs cannot well
predict this outcome because neither courts nor plaintiffs understand
quick look as well as per se and rule of reason; courts do not understand
quick look as well because they do not apply quick look as frequently as
per se and rule of reason.15 This vicious circle will likely endure because
most plaintiffs are not repeat players and have little to gain from helping
a court understand quick look; hence, cases applying quick look are rare.
This section looks at the history of the quick look analysis first by
discussing three necessary stages that lead to the birth of quick look: the
Sherman Act;16 the births of rule of reasons; and the birth of per se. This
section then explains the birth of quick look and closes by diving into
more detail into some of its progeny.
A. The Road and Stops to Quick Look
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. The Act uses
broad common law language and uses terms such as “in restraint of
trade” 17 or “attempt to monopolize” 18 that the courts must interpret.
Courts have interpreted these terms over time.
In 1911, the Supreme Court established the Rule of Reason in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 19 which made illegal any
“unreasonable restraint of trade.” 20 “Under this rule, the factfinder
15

Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1413 (2009).
16
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
17
Id. at § 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.”).
18
Id. at § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony.”).
19
“[T]he criteria to be resorted to in any given case for the purpose of ascertaining
whether violations of the section have been committed, is the rule of reason guided by the
established law and by the plain duty to enforce the prohibitions of the act and thus the
public policy which its restrictions were obviously enacted to subserve.” 221 U.S. 1, 62
(1911).
20
Id. at 87–88.
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weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on
competition.”21 This rule is the default method of analysis.22
In Standard Oil Co., the defendants were accused of conspiring to
monopolize the oil market. 23 The participants in the conspiracy
combined through agreements, stock purchase, and coercion to control
almost all the oil refineries in the Cleveland area. 24 Judicial history
ironically notes, much like Justice Harland did in his dissent, that
Standard Oil Co. involved restraints of trade, such as price fixing, that do
not require rule of reason, but instead require per se.25
The evolution to the modern rule of reason took many years. The
modern rule of reason commands a case-specific complex market
analysis26 that requires the plaintiff to identify the relevant geographical
market27 and the relevant product market, which parties can establish in a
number of ways.28
As early as 1927, the Supreme Court prohibited horizontal price
fixing agreements as unreasonable regardless of the pricing
reasonableness. In the Court’s view, price fixing had obvious adverse
effects on consumers: “naked” horizontal price fixing raises prices,
decreases output, and harms consumers.29 In 1940, the Supreme Court in
21

Cont. TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
Bus. Elects. Corp. v. Sharp Elects. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723–24 (1988).
23
Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 31.
24
Id. at 32–33.
25
Id. at 82–83.
26
Id.
27
See United States. v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1963) (noting
that the “area of effective competition in the known line of commerce must be charted by
careful selection of the market area in which the seller operates, and to which the
purchaser can practicably turn for supplies.”) (citations omitted).
28
See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956)
(“Determination of the competitive market for commodities depends on how different
from one another are the offered commodities in character or use, how far buyers will go
to substitute one commodity for another.”). This case is often referred as the cellophane
fallacy. The Supreme Court used cross-price elasticity to determine whether two
products are substitutes, whether the product manufacturer has market power and thus
whether he can raise prices without affecting quantity as substantially. The Court failed
to differentiate between capacity to increase prices further and capacity to increase prices:
du Pont in this case may have already used its market power and explaining why it could
not further increase prices; but the Court interpreted the high cross-elasticity to signify
that it never had power to increase prices. For further discussion of this issue, see
generally Robert Harris and Thomas Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated
Approach, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1984).
29
See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (holding
unlawful an agreement between manufacturers that represented 82% of the market to fix
prices regardless of the reasonableness of the price fixing).
22
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United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.30 established the per se rule for
price fixing agreements. “[P]rice-fixing agreements are unlawful per se
under the Sherman Act and . . . no showing of so-called competitive
abuses or evils which those agreements were designed to eliminate or
alleviate may be interposed as a defense.” 31 In other words, per se
condemns the actions of price fixing regardless of whether it succeeds.
Judicial history ironically notes again that Socony-Vacuum dealt with
quantity restriction, not price fixing.32 Numerous other kinds of conduct
that have similar effects upon prices or quantities have been and remain
per se unlawful.33
In per se cases, the plaintiff carries the burden of proof to show that
the defendant’s restraint falls within the category of per se restraints.
Once the plaintiff satisfies its burden of proof, “the per se rule create[s]
an irrebuttable presumption of unreasonableness,”34 not created by rule
of reason.
Per se finds support in judicial and business efficiencies. Justice
Black explained that the benefits of per se are three-fold: per se warns
businessmen of the unlawfulness of particular practices, avoids
administrative costs of repetitively proving the anticompetitive effects of
the same practices, and helps judges treat similar conduct in the same
way.35
Over twenty years later, Justice Stevens lamented the degree to
which courts apply per se and explained that “[f]or the sake of business
certainty and litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation of
some agreements that a fullblown inquiry might have proved to be
reasonable.” 36 As time went on, the cost of finding guilty innocent
venturers (false positives) outweighed the benefits of judicial consistency
and efficiency: broad application of per se did not seem worth these
benefits any more and, thus, slowly lost support.

30

310 U. S. 150 (1940).
Id. at 218.
32
Id. at 223–24 (holding that an agreement between horizontal competitors to buy
excess supplies from non-participating manufacturers was per se unlawful because the
agreement aimed at removing supply from the market in order to increase prices).
33
For instance, horizontal agreements to allocate markets or customers remain per se
unlawful because it has the same effect of decreasing competition, and raising prices. See
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Palmer v. BRG of
Georgia, 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
34
Andrew I. Gavil, Burden of Proof in U.S. Antitrust Law, 1 ISSUES IN COMP. L. &
POL. 125, 138 (2008).
35
N. Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
36
Ariz. v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).
31

278

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 10:271

The waves were changing and the Court was ready to ride them.37
These waves lead the Court to create a new analysis that combines
elements from per se and rule of reason and addresses their respective
drawbacks. Quick look was this new analysis, decreasing the number of
false positives associated with per se and also decreasing the judicial
inefficiencies associated with rule of reason.
B. BMI, NCAA, and California Dental: Moving Slowly But Surely
The Per Se rule and Rule of Reason form a dichotomy of rules:
antitrust cases are analyzed under either of these rules. However,
discontent grew with this dichotomy. Quick Look soon appeared as the
gap filler analysis that bridged the two already-established analyses. The
Court did not create this quick look bridge in one case but instead slowly
created it without giving it a name for a long time. This section focuses
on the slow birth of quick look.
During the same era when Justice Stevens expressed his discontent
with per se, the Supreme Court was already moving away from per se
and the dichotomy of rules. The first nail in the coffin of this dichotomy
came in National Society of Professional Engineers v. U.S. 38 In this
case, engineers who were members of the National Society of
Professional Engineers were prohibited from submitting any price
information to customers. 39 The association asserted that price
competition affected “the public health, safety, and welfare” because
engineers will use “inefficient and unnecessarily expensive structures
and methods of construction” in order to cut costs and be more
competitive.40 The Court rejected this justification, however, ruling the
restriction unreasonable41 and determining that per se and rule of reason
37

In Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, Daniel A. Crane discussed the
movement from rules embodied by per se illegal and per se legal activity and toward
standards embodied by the rule of reason. 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (2007). In
Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule of Reason,
Alan J. Meese discussed the Court’s move away from the per se rule and toward the rule
of reason with the end of the Populist era. Meese argued that quick look was a byproduct
of this movement and should be abandoned as over inclusive and leading to errors. 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 461 (2000). Prof. Nachbar argued that “[i]f the evolution of antitrust
analysis—the gradual abandonment of per se approaches to virtually every restraint—
teaches anything, it is that there are very few restraints that will harm efficiency with the
constancy necessary to justify their absolute prohibition in all circumstances.” The
Antitrust Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REV. 57, 113 (2013).
38
435 U.S. 679 (1978).
39
Id. at 683.
40
Id. at 685.
41
Id. at 696.
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were complementary. 42 More importantly, the holding in National
Society of Professional Engineers dimmed the line between the two
rules: the Court affirmed the lower court’s finding that the restriction was
per se illegal and did not require an in-depth market analysis;43 yet, the
Court allowed the defendant to offer some justifications. But those
justifications were not quite pro-competitive in nature, which courts
usually overlook in per se analysis.44
The following year, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc.45 [BMI] put a second nail in the dichotomy’s
coffin. In BMI, the defendants sold music recordings through blanket
license agreements. 46 Even though these blanket licenses were naked
price fixing agreements, the Court found that the agreements were
necessary for the license provider to offer this new product and achieve
the associated efficiencies.47 Thus, the Court allowed some efficiency
justifications in its analysis of a horizontal price fixing agreement
because “the whole is truly greater than the sum of its parts; it is, to some
extent, a different product.”48 In other words, Columbia Broadcasting
System created a new product, the bundle license, that cannot exist
without a horizontal agreement on prices. Since BMI, the question of
whether joint-venturers must horizontally agree on price to create a new
product has become central when courts investigate cooperation issues.49
A few years later, in National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of
Regents of Univ. of Okla.,50 the Court further addressed this cooperationnecessity issue. In this case, an association of colleges horizontally
agreed to form a football league.51 This association also negotiated the
league’s broadcasting rights.52 The Court recognized that competitors,
the schools, needed to cooperate in order to create a new product: the
42

Id. at 692.
“While this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement. It operates as an
absolute ban on competitive bidding, applying with equal force to both complicated and
simple projects and to both inexperienced and sophisticated customers.” Id.
44
The Court heard but yet rejected the Society’s argument with regard to safety
under the rule of reason. Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695.
45
441 U.S. 1 (1979).
46
Id. at 5.
47
Id. at 21.
48
Id. at 21–22.
49
See e.g. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 3 (2006) (holding that price agreement
of a lawful joint venture does not violate the Sherman Act).
50
468 U.S. 85 (1984) [hereinafter NCAA].
51
Id. at 94.
52
Id. at 95.
43
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college football league. League participants must agree on the size of the
field, the number of players, and so forth.53 Competitors, however, did
not need to agree on price and output to create that league.54
The Court asserted that “[t]his naked restraint on price and output
requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed
market analysis.” 55 More importantly, the Court let the association
present its pro-competitive justifications for its broadcasting agreement.56
But, the Court found that this agreement constituted a blanket price
agreement that was not necessary (and only ancillary) to create the new
product. 57 As a result, the Court struck down the price fixing portion of
the cooperation.
In BMI and NCAA, the Court faced horizontal price fixing
agreements. Instead of ruling them per se invalid, the Court looked at
the actions of the defendants and also considered pro-competitive
justifications for these actions. This double inquiry subtly marked a
movement away from per se on price fixing issues but did not quite
involve a rule of reason market inquiry.
The Supreme Court put the final nail in the proverbial coffin of per
se-rule of reason dichotomy in California Dental Ass’n v. FTC.58 The
Court recognized the existence of a third mode of analysis and coined it
Quick Look; nonetheless, the Court found that the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) erred in using quick look.59 In this case, the FTC
investigated an association of dentists, the California Dental Association
(CDA). The dental association had multiple purposes, from providing
insurance to lobbying on behalf of its members.60 The association also
required that its members not advertise using misleading or deceiving
information.61 The FTC “brought a complaint against the CDA, alleging
that it applied its guidelines so as to restrict truthful, nondeceptive
advertising, and so violated § 5 of the FTC Act,” 62 which prohibited
members from advertising about prices and quality; 63 and hence
amounted to a “‘naked’ restraint on price competition itself.”64
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 101.
Id. at 110.
Id.
NCAA, 468 U.S. at 114.
Id. at 114–15.
526 U.S. 756 (1999).
Id. at 765.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 762.
Id.
Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 763.
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During the administrative proceedings, an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) found a violation of § 5 of the FTC Act because the
limitation on advertising harmed dentists and consumers. The ALJ,
however, came to this conclusion without requiring an inquiry into
market powers under In re Massachusetts Board of Registration in
Optometry.65 The Commission affirmed this ruling and affirmed that the
quick look analysis was appropriate. 66 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
determined that per se analysis would have been inappropriate, but
approved of the quick look analysis because the association’s restrictions
amounted to a naked restraint on price.67
The Supreme Court reversed. In California Dental Ass’n, the Court
found that quick look was inappropriate for analyzing restraints on
advertising because this case “fail[ed] to present a situation in which the
likelihood of anticompetitive effects [was] comparably obvious.”68 The
Court ruled that the rule of reason analysis was the appropriate analysis
for this restrictive agreement because the effect on price is less obvious
than naked price fixing and requires a more in depth examination.69 The
Court stated that a quick look analysis was appropriate “when the great
likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained.”70 The
Court cited three such cases in which it applied an analysis close to a
quick look analysis: National Society of Professional Engineers; 71
NCAA;72 and FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists.73
The Court articulated two important points. First, the Court
recognized that the “categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are
less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of reason’ tend
to make them appear.”74 The Court described a spectrum75 where quick
look falls between the two extremes (per se and rule of reason). In other
65

110 F.T.C. 549 (1988).
Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 764.
67
Id. at 763.
68
Id. at 771.
69
Id. at 779.
70
Id. at 770.
71
435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (holding that “no elaborate industry analysis is required
to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of” horizontal conspiracy to refuse to
discuss prices with consumers).
72
468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984) (holding that an association of colleges that coordinated to
create a new football league conspired to restrict output when it restricted “the ability of
member institutions to respond to consumer preference” when the association restricted
their ability to televise games individually).
73
476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (holding that an horizontal agreement to withhold a
service was unlawful without requiring further inquiry into market analysis).
74
Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 771.
75
Id. at 780.
66
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words, the Court interpreted the three choices as choosing one analysis
along a single and continuous spectrum of analyses. In the Court’s view,
this choice depends on the investigated restraint.
Second, the Court explained that the quick look analysis is
appropriate when “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have
an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”76 But, the Court
left the identity of this observer open to interpretation.
Recently, the Court referred to quick look in Texaco, Inc. v.
Dagher, 77 and in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. et al. 78 In Dagher, the Court
limited per se and quick look further, finding that these two analyses
were inappropriate when addressing pricing decisions of a lawful joint
venture.79
In Actavis, Inc., the FTC brought a case against the participants of
reverse payment settlements because the FTC wanted these settlements
to be reviewed under antitrust laws.80 Reverse settlements occur when a
patent holder settles with an alleged infringer who receives a substantial
settlement payment in exchange for agreeing not to enter the market for
an agreed-upon period.81 In its decision, the Supreme Court refused to
apply quick look to reverse settlements because the anticompetitive
effects of reverse payments depend on a number of factors such as the
size of the payment and the litigation costs.82
From these Supreme Court decisions, courts must decide when to
apply quick look. The next section addresses the situations where
plaintiffs requested quick look and it describes how courts applied it. As
the next section evidences, courts often refuse to apply quick look and
quick look remains the territory of the FTC.
C. Since California Dental, Precedents Remain Far and Few With No
Consensus: Quick Look A Modified Per Se or A Truncated Rule of
Reason?
Around the same time that the Supreme Court accepted the
possibility of a quick look analysis, political changes pushed the Federal

76

Id. at 779.
547 U.S. 1 (2006).
78
133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013)
79
Dagher, 547 U.S. at 7 n.3.
80
See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2227.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 2237 (affirming that because of the complexity of reverse payment
settlement agreements, “he FTC must prove its case as in other rule-of-reason cases”).
77
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Trade Commission toward the same inquiry.83 Lower courts, however,
simultaneously struggled with quick look. As this section explains, these
courts reserve quick look for anticompetitive behaviors that satisfy two
requirements. First, courts reserve quick look for cases involving
anticompetitive behaviors for which they have accumulated some
judicial experience. This is because courts must rely on their experience
and precedents to employ quick look. Second, courts reserve quick look
for cases that involve anticompetitive behaviors that have the same
effects as per se, but are not per se on their face. Rather, these cases may
have pro-competitive justifications because of the unique market
conditions, which demand that courts compare the advantages and
disadvantages of the restraint.
Lower courts have reserved quick look for behavior with which
they already have extensive experience. 84 In this respect, quick look
resembles per se since a “per se rule is appropriate only after courts have
had considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue, and only
if they can predict with confidence that the restraint would be invalidated
in all or almost all instances under the rule of reason.”85
Similarly, courts apply quick look only if they have the required
experience. For instance, the Ninth Circuit ruled in California, ex rel.
Harris v. Safeway, Inc.86 that the case could not be decided under quick
look because prior judicial experience does not allow courts to resolve
the issue under per se or quick look analysis.87
California, ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc. et al 88 involved a
horizontal agreement amongst competitors to exercise their buying
power, referred to as monopsony or oligopoly power. The Ninth Circuit
initially found that a horizontal profit sharing agreement among grocery
store competitors was unlawful after “apply[ing] a per se-plus or a quick
83
“The power of appointment (and removal), we want to stress, is the most potent
means a president has to create a responsive bureaucracy. This is illustrated by the
Reagan administration’s careful choice of officials whose policy perspectives coincided
with those of the president and who were willing to act accordingly.” B. Dan Wood and
James E. Anderson, The Politics of U.S. Antitrust Regulation, 37 AM. J. OF POL. SCIENCE
1, 8 (1993) (citation omitted).
84
“The object is to see whether the experience of the market has been so clear, or
necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a
restriction will follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous
one.” Cal. Dental Assn. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999).
85
Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (U.S. 2007)
(internal quotations omitted).
86
651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011).
87
Id. at 1139.
88
615 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010).
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look-minus analysis.”89 However, after a rehearing en banc, the Ninth
Circuit reversed90 and ruled that the “quick look-minus analysis” was not
appropriate because prior judicial experience does not allow the court to
resolve the issue under per se or quick look analysis.91 The court thus
found that the defendants established sufficient doubt to raise the
analysis to a full-blown rule of reason analysis: co-conspirators still have
an interest in competing to retain current consumers or gain future
consumers because the pooling agreement is short-lived and limited to
15% share of the grocery market. 92
Next, courts have limited the application of quick look to practices
with effects similar to the effects of horizontal territorial division and
price fixing. Courts usually investigate horizontal territorial division and
price fixing under per se, but investigate other anticompetitive behaviors
with similar effects under quick look. The anticompetitive behavior may
present a factor or context that commands further analysis.
The Supreme Court reserves per se analysis for restraints that
“always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease
output.”93 Courts seemingly reserve the quick look for the same types of
cases and “have applied the quick look doctrine to business activities that
are so plainly anticompetitive that courts need undertake only a cursory
examination before imposing antitrust liability.”94
Courts has used quick look to review cases involving horizontal
conspiracies to restrain prices. For instance, in Polygram Holding, Inc.,
v. FTC,95 the D.C. Circuit ruled that the FTC appropriately uses quick
look when direct competitors conspire to restrain trade.96 In Polygram
Holding, two record companies formed a joint venture to produce a new
record. As part of the joint venture, they agreed to temporarily suppress
89
Id. at 1180 (“[A] per se-plus or a quick look-minus analysis [is] a combined or
mixed approach, somewhere between pure per se and pure quick look, along the lines
suggested by the Court in California Dental Association.”).
90
Cal., ex rel. Harris, 651 F.3d at 1118.
91
Id. at 1139.
92
Id.
93
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979).
94
Dagher, 547 U.S. at 7 n.3.
95
416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
96
Crane, supra note 38, at 63. Crane interprets Polygram to mean that “[r]ather than
specifying ex ante rules of conduct, it allocates burdens of proof and persuasion within
the litigation: Step One: The judge or agency considers whether the restraint obviously
harms consumers; Step Two: If so, the judge or agency concludes that the practice does
presumptively harm consumers, the defendant must come forward with a plausible and
legally cognizable efficiency justification; Step Three: If the defendant does, the burden
shifts back to the agency to address the justification, in one of two ways; and so forth.”
Id.
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promotion and price competition on two discs individually owned by
each company because these individual records were competing with the
companies’ joint venture. 97 The D.C. Circuit found that the companies
had unlawfully horizontally conspired to restrain trade.98
The Fifth Circuit, in North Texas Specialty Physicians v. FTC,99
also found that quick look is appropriate in cases involving horizontal
conspiracies to restrain price competition. 100 In this case, the FTC
challenged a minimum fee agreement by an association of independent
physicians where the independent and competing physicians associated
to negotiate fees with insurance companies.101 The association polled its
members, asking which minimum fee they were willing to accept, and
used their responses “to calculate the mean, median, and mode of the
minimum acceptable fees identified by its physicians.”102 Using quick
look, the ALJ and the Commission found that this sort of polling
represented horizontal price-fixing in violation of the FTC Act.103 The
Fifth Circuit court affirmed, finding that the “practices [bore] a very
close resemblance to horizontal price-fixing, generally deemed a per se
violation.”104
However, courts have not applied quick look to practices not
involving horizontal agreements with the effects of a naked price or
output fixing. 105 Rather, courts demand a rule of reason analysis for
horizontal agreements on non-price factors, such as industry standards.
For instance, in Continental Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.,106 the
court dealt with a non-price horizontal restriction involving restraints on
the permissible size of carry-on bags that passengers can fit through xray machines at security gates. The Fourth Circuit ruled that a cursory
quick look analysis was inappropriate because a court may find that
some of the pro-competitive justifications were not “illusory.” 107 The
court determined that quick look was inappropriate when “a challenged
97

Polygram, 416 F.3d at 32.
Id. at 38–39.
99
528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008).
100
See id.
101
Id. at 353.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 365.
104
Id. at 362.
105
See, e.g., American Ad Mgmt. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 790 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that “the present case does not present the type of naked restraint on price or
output that would justify a ‘quick look’” when a vertical market participant put price
restriction on the downstream participants or agents) (citations omitted)).
106
277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2002).
107
Id. at 514.
98
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restraint ‘might plausibly be thought to have a net pro-competitive effect,
or possibly no effect at all on competition.’”108
Courts also demand rule of reason analysis for vertical restraints.
For instance, in Gordon v. Lewistown Hospital,109 the court dealt with a
vertical restriction between a hospital and a physician. The Third Circuit
court ruled that quick look analysis was inappropriate when a hospital
disciplines and revokes the privileges of one of its doctors because this
revocation restrains the doctor’s practice. The court noted, however, that
“even if the Conditions [of the disciplinary decision imposed on the
defendant] were a restraint, they represent a nonprice vertical restraint
between one hospital and one physician,” which it had previously
reviewed under the traditional rule of reason.”110
Finally, courts demand the rule of reason analysis for vertical and
horizontal conspiracies. For instance, in Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co.,111 the Eighth Circuit found that the quick look analysis
was inappropriate where the manufacturer of a limousine input and an
association of competing downstream limousine manufacturers
attempted to prevent other downstream limousine manufacturers from
advertising in trade journals if they did not comply or show compliance
with certain safety standards.112
The court found that the plaintiff presented enough evidence that
the defendants collectively pressured to exclude the limousine
manufacturer from advertising.113 Yet, because the court found that the
defendants acted to enforce safety standards and “[b]ecause the
economic impact of safety standards is not immediately discernable,
something more than a cursory per se analysis is required to determine
whether the restraint was unreasonable.”114 The Eighth Circuit turned to
its sister court, the Seventh Circuit, for guidance: because the
anticompetitive effects were not immediately apparent, the rule of reason
was appropriate to weigh whether safety concerns outweigh advertising
restrictions.115
Courts limit their application of quick look to cases involving
horizontal agreement with the effects of a naked price fixing because
they have extensive experience with these behaviors. Courts may
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 510.
423 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 210.
363 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 776.
Id. at 772.
Id.
Id. at 775–76.
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usefully apply quick look to other types of cases, but remain reluctant to
do so because quick look remains misunderstood. A handful of other
district court cases have touched upon quick look without applying it to
the facts at hand.116 These district and circuit cases, however, show that
only the FTC has applied a quick look analysis without being overturned
on appeal. This fact has led some commentators to believe that only the
FTC can apply this type of analysis117 and that questions of quick look
cannot reach the jury. The following section shows that quick look can
and should reach the jury because courts should approach all three
analyses consistently.
III. A SPECTRUM OF ANALYSES: QUICK LOOK IN TWO STEP
In Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour Inc.,118 the plaintiff alleged
that the defendants conspired to restrain professional tennis players from
playing in the plaintiff’s tournament because the defendants lowered the
tournament ranking of the plaintiff and requested that these professional
players attend more highly ranked tournaments. 119 The Third Circuit
held that, because the defendants offered pro-competitive justifications,
the district court had properly instructed the jury “to analyze the alleged
restraints under the rule of reason.”120 In dictum, the Third Circuit, citing
116
See, e.g., New Eng. Carpenters Health Benefits Fund v. McKesson Corp., 573 F.
Supp. 2d 431, 435 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding that the quick look analysis was not
appropriate because the plaintiff failed to show “any anticompetitive effects at all, other
than to say in conclusory fashion” of an agreement between non-competitors to state
fraudulent drug prices); Madison Square Garden v. NHL, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81446,
at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (holding that “quick look doctrine is inappropriate
because the casual observer could not summarily conclude that this arrangement has an
anticompetitive effect on customers” when the plaintiff who owns a team who participate
complained of an horizontal agreement to restrain competition when the other league
members agreed by majority to have their website hosted together); Med Alert
Ambulance, Inc. v. Atlantic Health System, Inc. et al., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57083, at
*27–28 n.9 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2007) (refusing to use a quick look analysis “[b]ecause
Plaintiff can bring its claim under the rule of reason analysis, and further because the
issue of the ‘quick look’ test was not challenged by Defendants); Toscano v. PGA Tour,
Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1121 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that the quick look analysis
was inappropriate because “a rudimentary understanding of the market demonstrates that
the eligibility rules may have net procompetitive effects” when the plaintiff alleged that
the PGA Tour’s action prevented the formation of a competing Senior league).
117
Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a Quick Look but not the Full
Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495 (2000). Some observers believe that this may be a mixed
question of fact and law, which “may be hard to accomplish in a jury trial, but it plays to
the Commission’s unique role as an expert adjudicator.” Id.
118
610 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2010).
119
Id. at 826.
120
Id. at 833.
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the A.B.A. model jury instructions, went on to explain that quick look
could not be submitted to the jury anyway because “‘the application of
the quick look analysis is a question of law to be determined by the
court,’ and therefore the concept of ‘quick look’ has no application to
jury inquiry.”121 However, the A.B.A. never justified this statement,122
which has left the Third Circuit’s view subject to a great deal of
criticism.123 In fact, the Third Circuit Court was too hasty in determining
that quick look cannot go to the jury.
This section investigates the first reason behind why quick look
ought to go to the jury. Specifically, the Supreme Court in California
Dental Association stated that “[t]he truth is that our categories of
analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’
‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of reason’ tend to make them appear.”124 Thus
the three analyses lie along a continuous spectrum, sometimes referred to
as a single inquiry. 125 Furthermore, since per se and rule of reason
analyses have gone to the jury, the third analysis within this same inquiry

121

Id. (quoting ABA Section of Antitrust Law, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL
ANTITRUST CASES A-8 n.2 (2005)).
122
The ABA’s Model Jury Instructions provide in the pertinent part:
These instructions do not include a separate instruction for the ‘quick look’
analysis because application of the quick look analysis is a question of law
to be determined by the court. If the court, based on its quick look analysis,
determines that the defendant has come forward with a sound
procompetitive justification for the alleged restraint, then the ‘court must
proceed to weigh the overall reasonableness of the restraint using a full scale
rule of reason analysis.’ United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d
Cir. 1993) (holding that district court should have engaged in full rule of
reason analysis because quick look showed that defendant had sound procompetitive justification for the alleged restraint); see also Cal. Dental
Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999) (full rule of reason analysis was
required where challenged restraint ‘might plausibly be thought to have a
net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on competition’). For
an overview of the situations in which quick look analysis should be applied
and the factors that should be assessed, see ABA Section of Antitrust law, 1
Antitrust Law Development 62-65 (5th ed. 2002). See also Cal. Dental, 526
U.S. at 769–71, 779–80; Viazis v. American Ass’n of Orthodontists, 314
F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 2002); Continental Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.,
277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2002); Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 699; Chicago Prof’l
Sports, Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992).
ABA Section of Antitrust Law, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL ANTITRUST CASES
A-8-A-9 n.2 (2005).
123
See Gavil, supra note 17, at 779 n.223 (“The Model Jury Instructions misread the
cases it cites in support of this bold proposition, which was uncritically embraced in
Deutscher Tennis Bund.”).
124
Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 779.
125
Realcomp II, Ltd, v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 826 (6th Cir. 2011).
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must go the jury for consistency reasons, in the absence of any other
indication from the Supreme Court.
A. Per Se Rule Goes to the Jury and Quick Look Must Follow
When trial courts investigate antitrust cases under per se, the courts
involve the juries in a number of ways. Under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, a jury must decide whether a horizontal cartel exists in order to find
for the plaintiff. 126 For example, litigants centered Section 1 cases
around cartel existence issues in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.127
and the Supreme Court found that the lower court correctly submitted the
question of whether an agreement existed to the jury. 128 The Court
agreed that, because a conspiracy to fix prices is a per se violation,
whether the prices is reasonable is not an issue or a defense.129
Some courts, like the Eleventh Circuit, have fashioned pattern jury
instructions for civil cases. 130 Among these pattern instructions, the
Eleventh Circuit includes pattern jury instructions on per se
investigations. 131 Similarly, the A.B.A. model jury instructions, upon
which the Third Circuit bases its dictum, contain a section on per se
offenses.132 Thus, cases that courts decide under per se still go to the
jury to determine whether the elements of the case (such as price
collusion) are present.
Finally, quick look mirrors per se in some aspects because both
investigate the defendant’s actions, instead of the defendant’s market
126
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 701 (1962).
Parties may use circumstantial evidence to prove a conspiracy under Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act: the parties must present “sufficient evidence to go to the jury and it is
the jury which ‘weighs the contradictory evidence and inferences’ and draws ‘the
ultimate conclusion as to the facts.’” Id. at 700–01 (quoting Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. R.
Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944)).
127
273 U.S. 392 (1927).
128
See id. at 401 (“The charge of the trial court, viewed as a whole, fairly submitted to
the jury the question whether a price-fixing agreement as described in the first count was
entered into by the respondents.”).
129
See id. (“Whether the prices actually agreed upon were reasonable or unreasonable
was immaterial in the circumstances charged in the indictment and necessarily found by
the verdict.”).
130
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION (CIVIL CASES) (2005), available at
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/documents/pdfs/civjury.pdf; see also FIFTH CIRCUIT
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CIVIL (2006) (including sections on per se violation
§§ 6.1-6.2), available at http://www.lb5.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/.
131
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION (CIVIL CASES) 278–79 (2005),
available at http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/documents/pdfs/civjury.pdf.
132
American Bar Association, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL ANTITRUST
CASES 54–56 (2009).
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power.133 Additionally, both focus on judicial precedents and theories
instead of reasonableness of the actions.134 Courts already send per se to
juries through general and special jury instruction.135 Therefore, courts
should also submit quick look to the jury – through general or special
jury instructions – if litigants are worried about the complexity of certain
issues.136
B. Rule of Reason and Quick Look Demand the Trier of Facts to Balance
the Evidence
The fact that the quick look analysis mirrors per se is not the only
reason why it must also go to the jury. Quick look should go to the jury
because it mirrors the rule of reason in its other aspects. While cases
under per se focus on the issue of actions and horizontal agreements,
cases under rule of reason address less targeted questions and center on
the issue of reasonableness. Quick look mirrors rule of reason in the way
courts require a balancing of the proposed evidence and theories.137 The
two analyses borrow from each other.
133

See Cal., ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1133 (9th Cir. 2011)
(discussing how “per se treatment is proper only ‘[o]nce experience with a particular kind
of restraint enables the [c]ourt to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will
condemn it’” and how quick look requires “experience of the market . . . [to reach] a
confident conclusion”) (citation omitted).
134
Id. at 1134 (holding that “[f]ull rule of reason treatment is unnecessary where the
anticompetitive effects are clear even in the absence of a detailed market analysis” and
hence affirming that a court applies per se and quick look in this situation – focusing on
the anticompetitive behavior and circumventing the market analysis).
135
Courts can approve special interrogatories in order to help the jury focus on the
proper issues. See, e.g., ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION (CIVIL CASES),
supra note 132, at 284–85.
136
A group of 118 Law, Economics and Business Professors and the American
Antitrust Institute filed an amicus brief in FTC v. Watson Pharmaceutical, 133 S.Ct. 787,
No. 12-416 (filed 23 Jan. 2013) [hereinafter Scholars Brief]. In their brief, these scholars
argue in favor of reviewing reverse payment under quick look. They suggest a test that
focuses on the intent of the settlor and on pro-competitive justifications. The settlor’s
intent can be assessed from the size of the payment in comparison to litigation cost. The
pro-competitive justifications may take any form like in rule of reason cases. This
amicus brief also offers some specific questions that could guide a jury.
137
Polygram Holding, Inc., v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The D.C. Circuit
court accepts the four step analytic framework that FTC employed. Id. at 35-36. In North
Texas Specialty Physicians v. Federal Trade Commission, 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008),
the Fifth Circuit fashioned a shorter three-part analysis. Id. 361–62. Both quick look
analyses, however, employed by these circuit courts involved a balancing of evidence and
theories. Even in California v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2010), the
Ninth Circuit discussed a three step process involving weighing of the evidence before
the case was later reversed en banc because the majority found that quick look was
inappropriate for this case in California, ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118,
1139 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Sometimes, quick look and rule of reason mirror each other so
much that trial court applying quick look may move their investigation
into rule of reason territory. For instance, in Realcomp II, Ltd, v. FTC,138
the Sixth Circuit court affirmed, under rule of reason, a Commission’s
decision made under quick look without requiring further steps. 139
“[N]otwithstanding its initial quick-look analysis, the Commission
alternatively invalidated the challenged restraints under a more searching
inquiry, which included an assessment of Realcomp’s market power and
the actual, as well as likely, anticompetitive effects of its policies.”140
The Commission used a more extended quick look analysis, akin to a
rule of reason analysis.141 In spite of the labeling, the two analyses live
along a not-well-delimited spectrum.142
Sometimes, quick look and rule of reason mirror each other so
much that trial court applying rule of reason rely on tools usually
reserved for quick look analysis. For instance, in Todd v. Exxon Corp. et
al., the Second Circuit affirmed that anticompetitive effects used to
determine market power are not limited to quick look and used
anticompetitive effects as an “alternative way[] of demonstrating market
power.” 143 In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the six major oil
producers, particularly Exxon, exchanged information regarding
employees’ compensation in order to use that information to depress
employee wages and to essentially decrease competition for qualified
employees, excising their oligopoly power. 144 Because the plaintiff’s
market definition was over-inclusive and under-inclusive, 145 the lower
court determined that the plaintiff failed to prove market power and
dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. 146 The Second Circuit,
however, reversed and remanded the case,147 determining that the market
138

635 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2011).
See id.
140
Id. at 827.
141
See id.
142
One problem with quick look being so close to a rule of reason analysis is that the
litigants have to prepare for a full blown rule of reason case, unless it is very clear what
kind of evidence will not be needed early on. This dual trial preparation offers no
savings for the litigations. However, parties to a suit will most likely argue which
analysis applies and hence will often have to prepare regardless for the rule of reason
analysis. Therefore, the savings will come from judicial efficiency, and not necessarily
on trial preparations. The determination of the case will affect the procedure and the
burdens of proof during the trials.
143
Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 207 (2d Cir. 2001).
144
Id. at 196–97.
145
Id. at 201.
146
Id. at 206.
147
Id. at 214–15.
139
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definition is plausible.148 In its analysis, the Second Circuit court denied
that the district court applied quick look when this lower court used
anticompetitive effects to assess market power.149 The circuit noted that
using anticompetitive effects to assess market power “is not limited to
‘quick look’ or ‘truncated’ rule of reason cases.”150
Finally, quick look mirrors rule of reason in some respects but rule
of reason borrows some of quick look tools as well. Trial courts affirm
that rule of reason and the reasonableness of restraints both remain
questions of fact.151 Therefore, quick look should be a question of fact as
well.
C. Parties’ Jury Preferences Should Not Dictate the Mode of Analysis
In the past, the trial court decided whether to call a case per se or
rule of reason. Once it made that decision, the case went to the jury after
arguments to determine whether the plaintiff had satisfied his burden of
proof and showed all the elements of per se offenses (e.g. collusion) or
the unreasonableness of a restraint under rule of reason.
Today, on the other hand, a trial court decides whether per se, quick
look or rule of reason applies. Only per se and rule of reason, however,
go to the jury. Quick look cases should go to the jury because, in and of
itself, quick look is not a new mode of analysis since it borrows from
both the per se and rule of reason analyses, both of which already go to
the jury.
Additionally, quick look cases should go to the jury because they
live on the same spectrum as per se and rule of reason cases. Since all
the other elements of this spectrum go to the jury, the logical conclusion
is that so should quick look cases.152 Furthermore, quick look should go
to the jury because judicial consistency dictates that it should. If the
Supreme Court wanted to carve out an exception for the noninvolvement of juries with quick look, it would carve out an explicit
exception; in the absence of such instruction, quick look cases should
remain uniform with the other to modes of analysis, and thus go to the
jury.
148

Id. at 207.
Todd, 275 F.3d at 206–07.
150
Id. at 207.
151
See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“[R]easonableness is a question of fact . . . .”); Winn Ave. Warehouse, Inc. v.
Winchester Tobacco Warehouse Co., 341 F.2d 287, 287 (6th Cir. 1965) (“Whether a
restraint is unreasonable or whether there is any restraint is a question of fact.”).
152
Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 831 (6th Cir. 2011).
149
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Defendants will always argue for an analysis that allows them to
present more elements. They will argue that per se cases should be
analyzed under quick look or rule of reason; they will argue that quick
look should be analyzed under rule of reason. Yet, a hypothetical case
may present itself where a defendant will request quick look instead of
the rule of reason because he wants to avoid a jury and even if it faces
more unfavorable presumptions under the quick look. Under the current
rule, a defendant can defeat the plaintiff’s request for a jury trial merely
by arguing that the case ought to be analyzed under quick look instead of
per se.
Similarly, plaintiffs will always argue for an analysis that creates
more presumptions against the defendant. Plaintiffs will argue that rule
of reason cases should be analyzed under quick look or even per se; they
will argue that quick look cases should be analyzed under per se. Yet, a
plaintiff may request the rule of reason to assure that he gets a jury even
if quick look applies and offers more favorable presumptions because the
current rule inconsistently discourages them from requesting a quick
look analysis since the plaintiffs must give up their right to a jury trial.
To prevent these inconsistencies, quick look cases should go to the jury.
D. Quick Look Creates Presumptions and Shifts the Burden of Proof
This section discusses how quick look is not merely a mode of
analysis, but also a different burden of proof that creates different
presumptions.153 When a court decides to investigate under quick look,
the court not only decides the type of information to investigate but also
puts different burdens of proof on the plaintiff and the defendant.
The selection between the modes of analysis has been equated with
establishing the burden of proof, the presumptions to instruct the jury,
and the admissibility of evidence.154 Quick look analysis has its own

153
For instance in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013), the Supreme Court
refused to “hold that reverse payment settlement agreements are presumptively unlawful
and that courts reviewing such agreements should proceed via a ‘quick look’ approach,
rather than applying a ‘rule of reason’” because the anticompetitive effects of reverse
payments depend on a number of factors such as the size of the payment and the litigation
costs. Id. at 2237. Lower courts should consider anticompetitive arguments, as well as
pro-competitive or competition-neutral arguments.
154
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–80 (1999) (explaining that the
“quality of the proof required should vary with the circumstances;” that “naked
restraint[s] on price and output need not be supported by a detailed market analysis in
order to” move to the second step of the quick look analysis and “require” defendants to
produce “some competitive justification;” and that not “every case attacking a less
obviously anticompetitive restraint . . . is a candidate for plenary market examination”).
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presumptions 155 and admissibility issues: courts have interpreted quick
look as a process of weighing of evidence.
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the restraint is
theoretically or actually anticompetitive.156 If the plaintiff fails to carry
this burden, the court will dismiss the complaint.157 Nothing indicates,
however, that a jury is unable to make the same findings.158 On the
other hand, if the plaintiff satisfies this burden of proof, then the burden
shifts to the defendant to show that the restraint has pro-competitive or
competition-neutral effects. At this point, the defendant may bring in
empirical evidence but may also argue within the theoretical framework,
as the defendant attempted in North Texas Specialty Physicians v.
FTC.159 If the defendant fails, the court can rule in the plaintiff’s favor.
If the defendant shows pro-competitive or competition-neutral effects,
however, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who has one last chance
to introduce evidence. The court must then balance the evidence. This
balancing is not new to juries. They already perform this balancing for
the rule of reason analysis and they already balance facts in every civil
case, regardless of the subject matter, when deciding whether to believe
particular witnesses or evidence provided by plaintiffs or the defendants.
While the concept may not be new, some may argue that the topic
might be more “complicated.” 160 But, recall that quick look only
155
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (“Quick-look analysis in effect” shifts to “a
defendant the burden to show empirical evidence of procompetitive effects.”) (citing Cal.
Dental Ass’n, 526 U. S., at 775 n.12)).
156
Polygram Holding, Inc., et al. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
157
See, e.g., Viazis v. American Ass’n of Orthodontists, 314 F.3d 758, 766–67 (5th
Cir. 2002) (affirming summary judgment, finding that, even under the quick look
analysis, the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof and “to present data
demonstrating the anticompetitive effects of the advertising restrictions of which he
complains”).
158
Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve
Years, VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993)
(arguing that since his previous article on the topic entitled Civil Juries and Complex
Cases: Let’s Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICHIGAN L. REV. 68 (1981) little or no evidence
has emerged suggesting that “judges can cope with complex issues that juries cannot
master”—including antitrust cases).
159
N. Texas Specialty Physicians v. F.T.C., 528 F.3d 346, 368–69 (5th Cir. 2008)
(finding that the defendants offered “some evidence in the record of spillover effects
from the risk contract to non-risk panels, and [some] evidence that NTSP physicians
perform as well or better than non-NTSP groups”); see also supra text accompanying
notes 101–106.
160
See, e.g., Thomas M. Jorde, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial of
Antitrust Issues, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1981) (arguing that antitrust economic questions are
too complicated for juries and should be left to judges—while juries should only address
questions of conduct and damages); Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and
Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CAL. L. REV. 797, 813 (1987) (“[T]he Court also
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requires a rudimentary understanding of economics—unlike the rule of
reason analysis, which involves practices requiring more than a
rudimentary understanding of economics and demands juries to
determine reasonableness of complicated business practices.
Both the per se rule and rule of reason analyses leave a number of
complicated questions for the jury. 161 Both have been submitted to
juries. As a result, there is no reason why quick look should not be
submitted to juries as well. Courts’ fears that quick look cases are more
complicated than per se or rule of reason cases can easily be diffused by
adequate guidance from the judge and jury instructions, spelling out what
must be proven under the quick look test. If properly instructed, the jury
will decide properly.
E. Scholastic Interpretation of Quick Look
Scholars are split on their interpretations of quick look: some argue
that quick look is a shorter version of rule of reason;162 others argue that
quick look is an analytic procedure. 163
However, these two
interpretations are sometimes nothing more than subtle semantic
differences.
First, detractors of quick look interpret the rule as a poor-man’s rule
of reason in which shortcuts lead to costly judicial mistakes. For

has limited the right to jury trial by stating that it hinges, among other things, on ‘the
practical abilities and limitations of juries.’ While the Court offered this test with
reference to issues, not entire cases, several lower courts have denied jury trials in
antitrust cases of great complexity.”) (internal citations omitted). See infra Part III
(arguing that Patent questions already go to the jury and often require more complicated
engineering questions than rudimentary economic questions).
161
In Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, Justice Brandeis identified
the following factors that a judge or jury must consider when determining
reasonableness:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates, and
perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question, the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied, its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed, the nature of the restraint, and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918).
162
Catherine Verschelden, Is the Quick-Look Antitrust Analysis in PolyGram Holding
Inherently Suspect?, 32 J. OF CORP. L. 447, 452 (2007).
163
See Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830–31 (3d Cir.
2010) (explaining that quick look is a three step process); Crane, supra note 38, at 63
(explaining that “[a]lthough a reticulated burden-shifting framework remains in place, it
is procedural and flexible rather than substantive and rigid”).
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instance, Judge Frank Easterbrook 164 argues that because of these
shortcuts to the rule of reason, judges will condemn new practices that
they do not at first understand because of their lack of experience and
expertise. 165 Judge Easterbrook asserts that if defendants do not have
market power, their harmful practices will be unsuccessful and the
market will correct this harm, which makes judicial intervention
pointless.166 Other scholars argue that market power remains important
because market power is dispositive of intent.167 In short, market power
and even consumer harm 168 act as a filter for cases, but not for bad
behavior.
Some scholars, however, have advocated that quick look should be
applied in a sequential way, adapting as each case develops.169 If the
cost of gathering information on efficiency of horizontal behaviors is
lower than the cost of gathering information on market power, then the
analysis should start with the efficiency of horizontal behaviors.170 This
first step of the analysis will act as a gatekeeper for cases and the court
can stop its analysis if the plaintiff does not successfully carry his burden
of proof on each balancing question.171
Of recent times, the Court has encouraged judicial efficiencies by
giving a more important gatekeeping role to courts. In Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly,172 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must allege
enough specific facts when stating a claim in order to avoid a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.173
Therefore, the Supreme Court encourages lower courts to filter cases
164

Frank H. Easterbrook, Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law, 75 CAL. L. REV.
983 (1987).
165
Id. at 986–87.
166
Id. at 989.
167
C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules,
67 ANTITRUST L. J. 41, 48 (1999).
168
Meese, supra note 38, at 479–80 (arguing that quick look is a step in the wrong
direction and that courts should apply the merger guideline to anticompetitive behavior
because, without a thorough investigation, the court shifts the burden of proof without
meaningful proof of consumer harm and anticompetitive effects).
169
Beckner, supra note 169, at 68–70.
170
Id. at 69.
171
Id. at 70.
172
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
173
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Court removed the doubts that this
gatekeeping duty was limited to antitrust cases. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments,
25 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 61, 64 (2007) (“As matters now stand, it looks as though the
decision has made a general transformation in pleading rules in all cases, not just within
the antitrust area, although only the future will show for sure.”).
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better; it should encourage these courts to apply quick look to further
filter cases: if a plaintiff cannot win under quick look, he will not
succeed under rule of reason.
However, these two gatekeeping tools differ. If the Court wanted
only judges to apply quick look, it need not have created a new mode of
analysis because such a tool already exist in the form of summary
judgment. The Supreme Court wanted courts to have two tools and it
should encourage the use of both. Courts can benefit from this
encouragement because, with practice, lower courts will understand
quick look better and will be able to direct juries better.
Second, supporters of quick look argue that quick look, as a
procedural tool, offers the flexibility that courts have already enjoyed
with per se but yet should not exist: after a trial court chooses which
analysis to apply and reviews the facts of the case, it may not be satisfied
with its choice and extend its analysis beyond the traditional analysis
boundaries—and reach a rule of reason analysis.174 The Supreme Court
essentially applied this logic in the per se analysis in NCAA and BMI,
where the Court began by applying a per se analysis and, when it became
more familiar with the facts, let in pro-competitive justifications.
Like any analysis, quick look offers some pros (e.g. judicial
efficiencies much like per se) and cons (e.g. higher rate of false positives
than rule of reason). Courts should not, however, treat quick look like
the unwanted middle-child: courts should apply quick look more often,
potentially in that gatekeeping role. Courts should not prevent juries
from reviewing quick look merely because the courts, themselves, do not
understand this analysis as well as the other two. Instead, courts should
direct the quick look analysis inquiry better.
Third, quick look advocates interpret the rule as a structured rule of
reason for inherently anticompetitive behaviors. Because quick look
applies to inherently anticompetitive behavior, some scholars point to
specific scenarios in which quick look should prevail over per se and rule
of reason analysis. For instance, a large number of legal and economic
scholars as well as the American Antitrust Institute encourage the use of
quick look in courts’ review of reverse payment settlement. 175 They
174
Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 832 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“Although competitive harm is initially presumed under ‘quick look,’ ‘[i]f the defendant
offers sound procompetitive justifications . . . the court must proceed to weigh the overall
reasonableness of the restraint using a full-scale rule of reason analysis.’”) (quoting U.S.
v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir.1993)); see also Crane, supra note 38, at 63
(explaining that quick look “is procedural and flexible rather than substantive and rigid”).
175
Scholars Brief, supra note 138, at 30–35.
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argue that the rule of reason is not appropriate because reverse payment
have only anticompetitive effects and no pro-competitive effects.176 In
this group’s view, quick look is appropriate because it creates a
rebuttable presumption of illegality.177
Some quick look advocates argue that standard setting is another
area in which quick look could be useful.178 Since standard setting has
great benefits – such as network effects179—but also great drawbacks—
such as lock-in effects180—standard setting lends itself to quick look and
its balancing.181 Standard-setting consortia should hold the presumption
of validity because standard setting offers such large benefits.182
IV. IMPLICATION OF THE “OBSERVER STANDARD”
The Supreme Court determined that quick look is appropriate only
where “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics
could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”183 When defining its
observer standard, the Court did not specify a judge with rudimentary
understanding of economics (or the FTC) but an observer with a
rudimentary understanding of economics.184 Thus, it would be improper
to assume the Court intended to restrict quick look to judges or the FTC
because if the Court wanted such restriction, it could have simply written
so. This section addresses the economics-educated observer standard
that the Supreme Court defined in California Dental Association.
Although courts have expressed that the economics-educated observer
standard is too high a standard to meet, I argue that this heightened
standard may not be as high as first thought.

176

Id. at 32.
Id. at 34 (arguing that the “[t]he presumption in K-Dur ‘could be rebutted by
showing that the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers
some pro-competitive benefit’”) (citing In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F. 3d 197,
218 (3d Cir. 2012)).
178
Douglas D. Leeds, Raising the Standard: Antitrust Scrutiny of Standard-Setting
Consortia in High Technology Industries, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
641 (1997).
179
Id. at 646–47.
180
Id. at 650.
181
Id. at 669–70.
182
Leeds argues that reviews impose delay that can hamper innovation. Id. at 665. If
the purpose of antitrust review is to promote innovation and the best standards, quick
look creates a presumption hard to overcome. Id. at 669.
183
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (emphasis added).
184
Id.; see also NCAA, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Nat’l Soc’y Of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S.
679, 692 (1978).
177
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While the Court did not explicitly address whether quick look cases
should go to the jury, it provided enough context to assert that it should.
The Court used the term “observer” in two separate occasions; the
Establishment Clause context and Patent law context.
A. Establishment Clause and the Reasonable Observer Standard
The Supreme Court first introduced the objective or reasonable
observer in Lynch v. Donnelly185 and this observer standard “gradually
became a part of the Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine as a means
for evaluating the constitutionality of a government action’s effect.”186
Lynch called for the “[e]xamination of both the subjective and the
objective components of the message communicated by a government
action . . . to determine whether the action carries a forbidden
meaning.”187
Thus, the Court called upon the values of a reasonable person to
resolve two questions: (1) whether a reasonable observer would perceive
the challenged action as a governmental action;188 and (2) whether the
challenged action is an endorsement of religion.189 The Court interpreted
the first question, whether the challenged action amounted to a
governmental action, as a question of fact.190 Recently, the Court has
reiterated this interpretation in Salazar v. Buono, 191 in which it
acknowledged that the reasonable observer standard is a fact-sensitive
inquiry.192 Yet, the Court interpreted the second question, whether the
challenged action amounts to an endorsement of religion, as a question of
law.193
Lower courts are left wondering:194 they must call upon the average
consciousness because “reasonable observer” has also been equated to
185

465 U.S. 668 (1984).
Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through the Objective Observer’s
Eyes: The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 417, 445
(2006) (internal quotation omitted).
187
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
188
Id.; see also Joki v. Board of Educ. of Schuylerville Central Sch. Dist., 745 F.
Supp. 823, 827, 829 (N.D. N.Y. 1990).
189
Bowman, supra note 188, at 485.
190
Id.
191
559 U.S. 700 (2010).
192
Id. at 721 (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005)); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992).
193
Bowman, supra note 188, at 485. See Lynch 465 U.S. at 694 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he question is . . . in large part a legal question to be answered on the
basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.”).
194
Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. American Atheists, 132 S. Ct. 12, 19–20 (2011)
(The Court rejected the petition for certiorari, writing that “[o]ne might be forgiven for
186
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the “average observer” but fail to find a consistent standard.195 It seems
almost natural that a jury of our peers would be more adept to express
this average opinion than a bench of well-educated judges. That is why,
unsurprisingly, the reasonable observer standard has evolved into a
mixed question of law and fact196 and with Salazar, seems to moving
closer to a question of fact.197
The leap from one observer to the next seems easy. The reasonable
observer standard, however, can arguably be distinguished from the
economics-educated standard because a juror does not require any
outside knowledge to apply the reasonable observer standard. The same
cannot be said about the explicitly termed economics-educated standard.
This outside knowledge distinction has little hold because the Court has
allowed information to be introduced at trial even with reasonable
observer standards: 198 the Court softens its hold upon the reasonable
observer because the Court believes that the “endorsement test
necessarily focuses upon the perception of a reasonable, informed
observer.” 199 Thus, the reasonable observer must either already be
informed or must receive some information or evidence during the trial.
The observer with rudimentary understanding of economics could be put
in the same category.

failing to discern a workable principle that explains . . . wildly divergent outcomes [of
previous cases]. Such arbitrariness is the product of an Establishment Clause
jurisprudence that does nothing to constrain judicial discretion, but instead asks, based on
terms like ‘context’ and ‘message,’ whether a hypothetical reasonable observer of a
religious display could think that the government has made a law ‘respecting an
establishment of religion.’ Whether a given court’s hypothetical observer will be ‘any
beholder (no matter how unknowledgeable), or the average beholder, or . . . the ‘ultrareasonable’ beholder,’ is entirely unpredictable.”) (internal quotations omitted).
195
Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1491 (10th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990) (finding issue of material fact regarding how average
observer would interpret city logo).
196
See Christian M. Keiner, Preaching from the State’s Podium: What Speech is
Proselytizing Prohibited by the Establishment Clause?, 21 BYU J. Pub. L. 83, 84 (2007)
(“Most recently, in the 2005 term Ten Commandments cases, ‘proselytizing’ appeared to
evolve into a question of fact, or mixed question of law and fact, rather than a conclusion
of law.”).
197
See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 798 n.3
(1995); McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545
US 677 (2005).
198
Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, NM, 541 F.3d 1017, 1031 (10th Cir. 2008)
(“The objective or reasonable observer is kin to the fictitious ‘reasonably prudent person’
of tort law. So we presume that the court-created ‘objective observer’ is aware of
information ‘not limited to ‘the information gleaned simply from viewing the challenged
display.’”) (internal citations omitted).
199
See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 773 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

Spring 2014]

Juries Can Quick Look Too

301

As the Court continues to refine this reasonable observer standard,
the Justices will move toward making the question of a “reasonable
observer” more and more a question of fact instead of a question of law.
The Court has established this reasonable observer standard as a
question of fact for more than a century. The quick look observer
standard need not go through the same slow process as the reasonable
observer standard. This new standard should benefit from the Court’s
experience with the reasonable observer standard and with the ordinary
observer standard discussed next.
B. Patent Litigation and the Ordinary Observer
The Supreme Court uses an “ordinary observer” standard in the
intellectual property context. 200 The Court established this ordinary
observer test in Gorham Manufacturing Co. v. White:201
If, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if
the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing
him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one
patented is infringed by the other.202

In the same opinion, the Court rejected an “expert” standard. 203
Thus, an ordinary observer of the two products has to decide whether the
products are similar enough to risk deception.
Considering this ordinary observer standard, the Court later
affirmed that the question of infringement “might present a question of
fact for a court or jury.”204 Of course, different circuit courts have had to
refine the ordinary observer standard over the years 205 and these
refinements led to two different tests: “the copying/unlawful
appropriation test associated with the Second Circuit [and] the
extrinsic/intrinsic test associated with the Ninth Circuit.” 206 The
distinction between the two is not germane to this paper.

200
See, e.g., Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 467 (1893); Howe Scale Co.
v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118, 140 (1905).
201
81 U.S. 511 (1871).
202
Id. at 528.
203
Id. at 527.
204
See Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 185 U.S. 403, 441 (1902).
205
Robert C. Osterberg and Eric C. Osterberg, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN
COPYRIGHT LAW, § 3 (2012).
206
Id. at § 3–2.
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As technology becomes more complex, however, some questions
will naturally become more difficult than others.207 Courts must decide
whether to admit expert testimony to educate the jury.208 Depending on
the test, some experts have been allowed to weigh-in and educate the
trier of facts on the similarities between the products.209 Of course, the
courts only allow the trier of fact to make the final decision on the
question of infringement.210
The general “ordinary observer test” differs from the copyright
infringement subtests because “expert testimony generally [is] not
considered in connection with the ordinary observer test.”211 Courts do
limit what experts may do: the experts cannot tell a jury whether two
products are similar; however, the experts may educate a jury on some
subtests and the function of each element of the product.212
This distinction between telling a jury that two items are similar
and describing to a jury a selection of functions of two separate products
seems almost fictional and has led some to call for the end of this
artificial subtle distinction. 213 As technology and computer programs
become more and more predominant on the copyright infringement
scene, juries are going to need experts. Courts have already made

207
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232–33 (3d Cir.
1986) (holding that the ordinary observer test should not be applied in cases where the
subjects of copyright are particularly complex, such as computer programs).
208
See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (allowing expert
testimony under the substantial similarly test); Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattell, Inc., 518 F.3d
628, 637 (9th Cir. 2008) (drawing the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic test,
where the former test allows expert, while the latter does not).
209
See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 939 (1991) (discussing the differences between the
substantial similarity test, intrinsic test, and the involvement of expert testimony with
each test).
210
See, e.g., Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
211
Osterberg, supra note 207, at 3-5.
212
See, e.g., Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co. v. Lasko Metal Prods., 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13491, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2001) (“The Federal Circuit has recognized that
expert testimony and testimony by a defendant’s employee are proper evidence upon
which a jury could rely in deciding that a design patent has been infringed.”).
213
See Graham Ballou, Substantial Disparity: Copyright Chaos in the Second Circuit,
2 N.Y.U. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. LEDGER 45 (2011) (“Expert testimony on substantial
similarity would, at the least, clear judicial fog at this stage of a copyright infringement
analysis: courts could abandon the fiction of an objective, ‘ordinary observer’ perspective
– the controlling test for substantial similarity – and allow specialists to conduct what is
in fact a highly technical analysis.”).
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exceptions, 214 and more will come until the superfluous distinction
fades.215
In many respects, the ordinary observer standard may best represent
the way in which lower courts should interpret the economics-educated
standard because of their similarities and the potential for complicated
questions. These complicated questions must involve experts in the
same way: courts must use experts to educate the jury.
C. The Role of Expert Witnesses
The ordinary and reasonable observers are legal fictions, much like
the reasonable person in tort law.216 The observer with a rudimentary
understanding of economics is likely to be a legal fiction as well: the
average juror will have little understanding of economics, whereas the
average expert will have more than a rudimentary understanding. Who
are those observers with rudimentary understanding of economics?
Because courts have allowed quick look analysis only for cases
brought and administered by the FTC, the FTC is the obvious answer. I
would argue, however, that all Commissioners have more than a
rudimentary understanding of economics. More importantly, Justice
Stevens could have as easily limited quick look analysis to FTC reviews.
But he did not. Therefore, in the absence of such language, the Court
must have intended to include other individuals in the category of
economics-educated observers.
Because a number of judges receive some economics education
during various continuing legal education programs, the Supreme Court
may arguably have extended this new observer standard to judges. 217
These programs are usually short, a few days at most. Courts could
encourage parties to educate juries through experts in the same ways
214
See, e.g., Marta Kowalczyk, Design Patent Infringement: Post-Egyptian Goddess,
2010 U. ILL. J.L., TECH. & POL’Y 239 (2010) (discussing the use of expert in patent
infringement litigation).
215
See, e.g., Christopher V. Carani, The New “Extra-Ordinary” Observer Test for
Design Patent Infringement—On a Crash Course With the Supreme Court’s Precedent in
Gorham v. White, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 354 (2009).
216
See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171, 1180 (10th Cir.
2009) (“[T]he ‘ordinary observer,’ like the ‘reasonable person’ in tort law, is a legal
fiction; it is the measure by which the trier of fact judges the similarity of two works.”);
Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, NM, 541 F. 3d 1017, 1031 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The
objective or reasonable observer is kin to the fictitious ‘reasonably prudent person’ of tort
law.”).
217
See, e.g., ABA Section of Antitrust Law and George Mason Judicial Education
Program, Antitrust Law & Economics Institute for Judges at the George Mason
University School of Law & Economics Center (Oct. 2011).
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during trials; alternatively, the court could pick the expert in order to
have a more neutral education.
The education of judges has had important impacts upon antitrust
cases. According to one empirical study, the education of judges affects
the outcome of cases and appeal rates. 218 This study used data on
antitrust cases brought between 1996 and 2006, and included information
on the training and experience of the judge, the judge’s political
affiliation, whether an appeal was filed, and circuit in which it was
filed.219 The researchers found that a judge’s basic economic training has
a negative and statistically significant effect upon the probability of a
plaintiff filing appeal for simple cases.220 This education, however, has
no statistically significant effect on complicated cases. 221 Thus,
educating juries can have potentially the same impact in giving them
rudimentary economics and can help with simple cases.
Most of the jury’s education will come from experts. However,
because this study classifies a case as simple or complex if judge’s
opinion includes terms like “expert witness,” “expert report,” and
“economic expert”, 222 then the presence of an expert renders the case
automatically complicated. Therefore, this study does not allow one to
determine whether experts affect a court’s appeal rate. As a result, this
study cannot be relied upon to determine whether an expert can educate a
court in a case that only requires a rudimentary understanding of
economics and it does not clarify whether a court (or a jury) can be
educated during the course of a case.
What are we to draw from this analysis? I would argue that juries
can easily gain a rudimentary understanding of economics: if juries have
been educated about engineering issues and similarities between product
functions, then they could be educated in economic issues and
similarities between business practices; 223 if judges benefit from a
218

Joshua Wright & Michael Baye, The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial
Training on Appeals, 54 J.L. & ECON. 1, 13 (2011).
219
Id. at 6.
220
The study uses a probit with the probability of having a decision appealed as the
dependent variable and the training of the judge as the independent variable. Id. at 14.
221
Id. at 15.
222
Id. at 7.
223
Crane, supra note 38, at 92–94 (arguing that juries are ill-equipped to deal with
antitrust issues and judges are better equipped to deal with contested economic theories
presented by experts). Nonetheless, I would first argue that if per se or the rule of reason
analyses go to the jury, then all three analyses ought to go to the jury for consistency (see
infra) and second if juries can decided the resemblances between complicated patents,
they ought to be able to understand economics issues, with which they are likely to have
more daily experience. Irrelevantly, judges act as gatekeepers of experts under Daubert
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summary economics education, then juries will likely also benefit or at
least will pick up enough understanding of economics to qualify as a
rudimentary economics education.224
Furthermore, courts have submitted previous observer standards to
the jury. 225 All these standards have emanated from common law
interpretations of the Constitution. Congress wrote the Sherman Act in
vague terms to allow for common law interpretation and with common
law in mind. 226 Therefore, courts ought to similarly treat all these
common law observer standards: this new observer standard ought to be
no different in spite of what the Third Circuit has expressed in dictum.
Courts must submit quick look cases to the jury.
V. CONCLUSION
Some commentators speak of quick look as modified per se, while
others interpret quick look as truncated rule of reason. In practice, it
could probably be either, but is there a better way to think of it? As
Beckner and Salop argue, quick look may be the analysis that meets the
case.227 This adaptive approach, however, could minimize the role of
per se by shifting all per se cases toward quick look: courts should retain
some division between the analyses to take advantage of the judicial
efficiencies; yet, courts should not be timid and unwilling to look at more
evidence when the situation warrants it.
The Supreme Court may have to weigh in on the issue at some
point. Clues left in its previous opinions, however, point to the
conclusion that quick look ought to go to the jury. First, per se, quick
look, and rule of reason live along a continuum of analyses. Since per se
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and can assure that the experts are
qualified to educate the jury.
224
See generally John M. Majoras, You Too Can Win Antitrust Cases: The Myths and
Realities of Trying an Antitrust Case to a Jury, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 2 (2009) (“Most
jurors are unable to spout economic theory, but they intuitively understand many of the
fundamentals of economic theory from everyday experiences.”), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Jun09_Majoras6_29f
.authcheckdam.pdf
225
See Section IV A. & B. supra.
226
William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the
“Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1982) (“The
antitrust laws were written with awareness of the diversity of business conduct and with
the knowledge that the detailed statutes which would prohibit socially undesirable
conduct would lack the flexibility needed to encourage (and at times even permit)
desirable conduct. To provide this flexibility, Congress adopted what is in essence
enabling legislation that has permitted a common-law refinement of antitrust law through
an evolution guided by only the most general statutory directions.”).
227
Beckner, supra note 169, at 70.
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and rule of reason can go to the jury, so should quick look. More simply
put, courts determine whether a business practice falls under a certain
analysis according to precedents and effects; courts do not classify
practices as falling under a certain analysis according to the difficulty of
the economics involved.
Before any behavior may fall under quick look, courts must have
previously analyzed it under the rule of reason (and possibly per se)
analysis. Thus, these practices, which had been previously put to the
jury, should remain with the jury even if courts gained experience in
dealing with them because juries have already determined reasonableness
in the past.
Second, previous common law interpretations of the Constitution
have bred observer standards that have gone to the jury. Courts must
treat this new standard in the same way. The topic in antitrust case is
economics, which is not more complicated than computer programs in
patent cases. Furthermore, quick look’s standard only requires a
“rudimentary understanding” of economics, which ought to be attainable
thanks to expert testimonies.
While jury trials are rare,228 the possibility of a jury trial has a deep
influence upon the strategic decision to settle 229 or even to ex-ante
engage in any possibly anticompetitive behavior.230 Yet, with all their
faults, juries are part of the American civil judicial system and are here to
stay. Thus, the question is when should you use juries? The simple
answer is that juries should be used in a consistent manner.
In its haste, the Third Circuit may have looked to the wrong source
to determine whether quick look goes to the jury and the ABA may want
to take a closer look at their model jury instructions.231 Although other
circuits have not yet weighed in on the issue, they must act with more
careful deliberation than the Third Circuit, by following the clear clues
left by the Supreme Court.232
228
Crane, supra note 38, at 78–79 notes that only nine antitrust cases out of 818 were
tried by juries in 2005, less than 1% of the cases filed.
229
Id. at 92 (arguing that letting antitrust questions juries go to the jury has its own
issues because of their inherent bias against large corporation).
230
Id. at 99.
231
The AAI has announced that it is looking at civil antitrust jury instructions and will
be release their own model jury instructions in order to address some of the biases of
previous model jury instruction such as the embedded biases in the language used.
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/925CLE_0.pdf (last visited Feb. 8,
2014).
232
The Third Circuit’s analysis has already been discussed in articles and should be
rectified. See e.g. Ryan M. Rodenberg & Daniel Hauptman, American Needle’s Progeny?
Tennis and Antitrust, 2 PACE. I.P. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 103, 114 (2012).

